

THE
INTEREST

OF

HOLLAND

As to their

ALLIANCES

WITH

FRANCE,

Spain, England, &c.

Faithfully Extracted out of the Famous Monsieur JOHN DE WIT's *True Interest and Political Maxims of the Republick of HOLLAND.*

L O N D O N :

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INTEREST

W. Musgrave!

HOLLAND

As to their

ALLIANCE



Spain, England, &c.

THE HISTORY OF THE
BRITISH MUSEUM
FROM ITS FOUNDATION
TO THE PRESENT TIME
BY
JOHN BRIDGES
HOLLAND

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LONDON:
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JOHN BRIDGES
at the
MUSEUM

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Dutch Politicks,

OR, THE

INTEREST

OF

HOLLAND, &c.

Considerations touching the Alliances which Holland might enter into with mightier Potentates than themselves. And first with France.

TOUCHING the three great Powers of *France, Spain, and England*, is all the Difficulty, since each of them by their own Strength can always be Armed; and knowing how much we are concerned for Peace, neither of them fear
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us, but we must fear them. And therefore it is very necessary that we behave our selves very Prudently towards them, as to the Point of Alliances; which to effect the better, I conceive it necessary, as formerly, particularly to consider how much Good and Evil those Three Kingdoms may receive or suffer from the *Hollanders*, and likewise what Good or Evil can befall *Holland* by each of them.

As to *France*, we are to observe, that formerly that Country subsisted wholly by Tillage, and therefore could suffer little Damage by a War at Sea. But since the Reign of *Henry* the Fourth, many heavy Impositions have been laid upon all imported and exported Manufactures; and the Weaving of Silk, Wool, and Linnen, with many other Mechanick Works, is so considerably improved there, that the *French* can supply others with more made Stuffs, and other Manufactures, than Foreigners take off. So that a War against us, would be more Prejudicial to them than to us.

But because this First Point is of extraordinary Weight, and perhaps not so well understood by others, I find myself obliged to draw up a List of Manufactures

manufactures and Commodities exported out of *France* into Foreign Parts, especially into *Holland*, according to a Scheme presented to the King of *France* by the Society of Merchants at *Paris*, when a new and very high Imposition was laid upon all Foreign Imported Goods, and especially Manufactures, fearing lest the like Imposition would be laid by *Holland* and *England* upon all *French* Goods: And also from an Information exhibited by the Lord Ambassador *Boreel* in 1658, to the Lords States General of the *United Provinces*.

1. In the first Place great Quantities of Velvet, Pluthes, Satins, Cloth of Glod and Silver, Taffaties, and other Silk Wares, made at *Lions* and *Tours*, which amount to above Six Millions.

2. In Silk Ribbons, Laces, Passements, Buttons, Loops, made about *Paris*, *Roan*, and those Parts, to the value of Two Millions.

3. Bever-Hats, Castors, Hats of Wool and Hair, which are made in and about *Paris* and *Roan*, to the value of One Million and a Half.

4. Feathers, Belts, Fans, Hoods, Masks, gilt and wrought Looking-glasses, Watches and other small Wares, to the value of above Two Millions.

5. Gloves made at *Paris, Roan, Vendome, and Clermont*, to the value of above a Million and a Half.

6. Woollen Yarn spun in all Parts of *Piccardy*, worth more than One Million and a Half.

7. Paper of all sorts, made in *Auvergne, Poitou, Limousin, Champagne and Normandy*, for upwards of Two Millions.

8. Pins and Needles made at *Paris and Normandy*, and Combs of Box, Horn, and Ivory, for a Million and a Half.

9. Childrens Toys, and such as *Nuremberg Ware*, or as the *French* call them, *Quincaillerie*, made in *Auvergne*, for upwards of Six Hundred Thousand Florins.

10. Linen Sail-cloth made in *Brittany and Normandy*, for upwards of Five Millions of Florins.

11. Household-goods, Beds, Matrasses, Hangings, Coverlids, Quilts, Crespines, Fringes and Molets of Silk, above Five Millions of Florins.

12. Wines from *Gascony, Xaintoigne, Nantois*, and other Places, for above Five Millions.

13. Brandys, Vinegars, and Sider, for Fifteen Hundred Thousand Livers.

14. Saffron, Woad, Soap, Hony, Almonds, Olives, Capers, Prunes, Prunellas, for above Two Millions.

15. Salt, yearly the lading of five or 600 Ships, exported from *Rochel*, *Maran*, *Brouage*, the Islands of *Oleron* and *Ree*.

And if we add to this the *French* Companies of Train and Whale-fins, of Cod and Pickled-Herrings, of Refining and fine Sugars, of all Spices and *Indian*-Wares, with prohibition to all that are not of the Company to import any into *France*; every one may then observe, that by a *French* War against us, the Inhabitants of *France* will be much more prejudiced than those of *Holland* in their Navigation and Traffick.

Secondly, It is apparent, That the *French* have very few of their own Ships and Mariners; so that all their Traffick is driven (some few *English* Ships and Traffick excepted) by *Holland* Ships to *Holland*, or at least unlading there. And moreover, when any Goods are to be transported from one *French* Harbour to another, they are put on board *Holland* Vessels.

Thirdly, It is clear, That the *Hollanders* do buy up most of the *French* Wines and Salt that are exported; and that Salt might be had in other Countries, and particularly in *Portugal*, *Spain* and *Punto del Rey*. As it is likewise true, that we can better forbear those Wines in *Holland*, than the *French* Nobility and Ecclesiasticks

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(to whom most of the Wines belong) can forbear our Money. And besides, by reason of the Peace in *Germany*, in case of War with *France*, the greatest Part of that Trade may be supplied with Rhenish Wines, and possibly continue so alienated, altho' the same were not so profitable for *Holland*, as the Trade by Sea in *French* Wines would be.

Fourthly, 'Tis well known, That in *France* very many *Dutch* Cloths, Says, Linen, Herrings, Cod, and other Wares, transported thither by our Ships, were formerly spent there; which now by new Impositions is much lessened, or wholly prohibited.

Fifthly, It is evident that *France* cannot attack us by Land, nor by Sea, for want of good Shipping, and on account of the Danger of our Coast: So that if they seize our Goods, Debts, and Ships, they can do us no farther Mischief, except by small Capers at Sea, which we may easily prevent by keeping Convoy-ships about *Ushant*, and sending some few Cruisers to pick up the Privateers that ply about the *Garonne*, and the *Loire*, and clear the North Sea of them. But the greatest harm that the *French* can do the *Hollanders*, would be in the *Mediterranean* Seas, where, by reason of our remote situation, we cannot

not without great Expence overpower them in Shipping. But our good Orders, according to which our Ships must be Armed and Manned, would preserve them from many Depredations.

Sixthly, It cannot on the other side be denied, that *Holland* with its great strength of Shipping, would be able to Plunder all that far extended *French* Sea-Coast, from the North Sea to *Italy*, and take those weak Towns and burn them, unless they were prevented by an extraordinary Force of Soldiery by Land; there being in *France* on the Sea-side very many weak Towns and Villages, and no Ships of War that dare keep the Sea against ours. Besides which, we should destroy all their Trade to the *East* and *West-Indies*, and indeed thorow all *Europe*; which is at present of so much importance to *France*, as hath been formerly declared. And when we further consider, that in all Governments of a single Person, the Treasure in a time of War is miserably wasted, as shall be farther demonstrated when we come to speak of *England*; we shall have reason to believe, that we should be able either to ruin the *French*, or compel them to a Peace.

By all which it clearly appears, that a King of *France* may not make War
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upon us, for fear of receiving great Damage from us, or others in our behalf, nor in hope of Conquering us, nor yet through vain Glory: But that on the contrary a War against us would immediately cause all *French* Traffick and Navigation to be at a stand, and endanger the loss of it for the future.

And moreover, if we observe that *Spain* in some measure, and *England* yet more, used to be formidable to *France*, it will further appear, that we never ought, by any Threatnings of *France* to make War against us, to suffer our selves to be drawn in to make any League with *France*, which we conceive would be prejudicial to us. And much less ought we, to please *France*, to suffer our selves to be brought into any War, by which the Strength of *Spain* or *England* should be impaired by the *French*: For having once done so, we should meet with more bold and troublesome Rencounters from them, and expect at last a more severe War from that Kingdom.

*Considerations concerning Holland's entring
into Alliance with Spain.*

AS to *Spain*, it is very observable, that all the welfare of that Kingdom

dom depends on their Trade to the *West-Indies*: And that *Spain* affords only Wool, Fruit and Iron; and in lieu of this, requires so many *Holland* Manufactures and Commodities, that all the *Spanish* and *West-Indian* Wares are not sufficient to make returns for them.

So that the *Holland* Merchants, who carry Money to most parts of the World to buy Commodities, must out of this single Country of all *Europe* carry home Money, which they receive in payment for their Goods, without Benefit and by stealth, over that raging and boisterous Sea.

2. It is well known that *Spain* during our Wars, lost most of their Naval Forces; and that we during our Peace, have for the most part beat the *Eastern* Merchants and *English* out of that Trade. So that it is now certain, that in *Spain* all the Coast is navigated with few other than *Holland* Ships; and that their Ships and Seamen are so few, that since the Peace they have publickly begun to hire our Ships to sail to the *Indies*, whereas they were formerly so careful to exclude all Foreigners thence.

3. It is manifest, that the *West-Indies*, being as the Stomach in the Body to *Spain*, must be joined to the *Spanish* Head by a Sea force: And that the Kingdom of Na-
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ples

ples with the *Netherlands*, being like two Arms, they cannot lay out their Strength and Vigour for *Spain*, nor receive any from thence but by Shipping. All which may be very easily done by our Naval Power in a time of Peace, and may as well be obstructed in a time of War.

4. It is likewise certain, that *Holland* by its naval Strength, is able wonderfully to encumber and perplex this whole dispers'd Body in time of War, and accordingly put them to the Charge of Maintaining an incredible Number of Land Forces in Garrisons.

But on the other side, it is likewise true,
1. That the King of *Spain* must continually maintain a great Military Strength against the mighty Kingdom of *France*, and in those great and jealous *Netherlandish* Cities, or else lose his Countries

2. It is known, That the said King has Pretensions to *Holland*, and a very powerful Adherence of the *Roman-Catholicks*; tho' the strength of both these since our Peace, and his laying down all Pretensions to our Country, and especially by the expiration of so many Years, and our own confirmed and improved Government, is very much diminished, and almost annihilated.

3. It is likewise evident that *Spain*, by *Brabant's* bordering on *Holland*, and by
means

means of the *Flemish* Sea-Havens, is able to disturb our Fisheries, and Traffick, in this small North Sea.

4. It is certain, That this State of Free Government will not think it advisable, tho' they should fall into a War with *Spain*, to take any more *Netherlandish* Cities by exceeding chargeable Sieges.

5. It is manifest that all the Frontiers of the *United Netherlands* are so well Fortified, that we are not likely to lose any of them, unless by their great Number; and yet if they are in any wise well Defended, they would hardly pay the Damage to *Spain*.

Moreover, *Spain* would then have Reason to expect that we should excite *France*, according to the Interest of the Kingdom, to prevent any additional Increase of *Spain* by making War on his Frontiers, which would always in such Cases be very terrible to *Spain*.

So that by all that hath been said, it is manifest that *Spain* may receive many great Advantages by *Holland* in time of Peace; and that a War is very Prejudicial for both sides: Yet so, that there is much more appearance for the King of *Spain* to gain upon us by Land, than for us upon him, unless we should reckon the Plundering and Burning of his Cities in *Spain*, and the losing his Gallions at Sea to ballance it.

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Because, as we have said before, our free Rulers having their Eye upon Trade do always decline an Offensive War, and will carry on none but what is Necessary and Defensive only.

Whence we may also infer, that out of fear of a War we ought never, against the Interest of this State in it self considered, to make Alliances with *Spain*; and much less should we suffer our selves to be led away to make the least War against any of our Neighbours who are formidable to him; since the greatest Quiet of this State consists in this, That *France* be formidable to *Spain*, and *England* a Friend to us.

*Considerations touching Holland's entring
into Alliance with England.*

AS for *England*, we are to know, that heretofore it wholly subsisted by Husbandry, and was wont to be so naked of any Naval Power, that the Hans-Towns being at War with *England*, they compelled King *Edward* in the Year 1470, to make Peace upon Terms of Advantage to them. And so long as the *English* used to transport nothing but a few Minerals, and much Wool, which they carried to *Calais* by a small number of their own Ships, and sold only to *Netherlandish* Clothiers,

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it would have been so Prejudicial for the King to forbear his Customs of Wool, (which at *Calais* alone amounted to 50000 Crowns *per Annum*) and likewise to the Subject, in case he had made War upon the *Netherlands*, That we read not that these trading Provinces ever broke out into a perfect open War against *England*. For tho sometimes War happen'd between the Princes of the respective Countrys, nevertheless most of the Citys concerned in Traffick and Drapery, continued in Amity. In so much that all the Wars of that rich and plentiful Country broke out against *France*, and consequently against *Scotland*, or else against *Wales* and *Ireland*, and sometimes against *Spain*.

But afterwards, when the compulsive Laws of the *Netherlandish* Halls, and the tumultuous rising against them which followed, together with our Inland and Foreign Wars, had first driven the Cloth-weaving into our Villages, and thence into *England*, and by the Cruelty of the Duke of *Alva* the Sav-weaving went also after it; the *English* by degrees fell to vend their Manufactures throughout *Europe*, became potent at Sea, and began no longer to depend on these *Netherlands*. Then by the discovery of that unexpressible rich Cod-bank of *Newfoundland*

land, those of *Bristol* in particular made use of that advantage; and ballasting their Ships with *English* Lead, Tin, and other Wares, when they had compleated their Fishing of Cod on the said Bank, they sailed with it to *Spain*, and throughout the *Mediterranean*, to vend their *English* Wares with their *Baccalieu*, or *Poor-John*, in all those Parts, and in return carried other Goods of those Lands to *England*.

Finally, we may add the long Persecution of the Puritans in *England*, which causing the Planting of many *English* Colonies in *America*, hath given *England* a very great Conveniency to drive a mighty Foreign Trade with the *Indies* and the said Colonies.

So that this mighty Island, united with the Kingdom of *Ireland* under the Government of one King, seems not to have need of any Garrisons to repel a Foreign Enemy, is situated in the midst of *Europe*, having a clean deep Coast, furnished with good Harbours and Bays, in so narrow a Sea, that all Foreign Ships that sail to the Eastward or Westward, are necessitated even in fair Weather to shun the dangerous *French* Coast, and sail along that of *England*, and in stormy Weather to run in and preserve their Lives, Ships, and

and Goods, in its Bays. So that it is easy to judge, that the said King having acquired a considerable Naval Power, and being independent on all his Neighbours as to Trade, is very considerable to all that are concerned in Navigating the said Narrow Seas.

For according to the Proverb, * A Master at Sea is a Lord at Land, and especially a King of *England*, seeing he is able both by whole Fleets of Ships, and private Ships of War, at all times to seize Ships that sail by that Coast; the Westerly Winds which blow for the most part on this side the *Tropick*, giving the *English* great Opportunities to sail out of their numerous Bays and Harbours at pleasure, to infect our Navigation. And if this Commerce to the Eastward and Westward were stopt, or prevented, it would certainly prove the Ruin of *Holland*.

Which formidable Power of the Kingdom of *England*, King *Henry* the Eighth was so sensible of, that he dared to use this Device, † He whom I assist shall be Master: And accordingly made War as he listed, sometimes against *France*, sometimes against *Spain*; which was then strengthened

* Imperator Maris, Terræ Dominus.

† Cui adhæreo præst.

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strengthened with the *German Empire*,
and these *Netherlands*; making Peace at
his own pleasure, both with *Francis* the
First, and *Charles* the Fifth, whom he
durst so horribly despise, as to repudi-
ate his Aunt.

So that *England* now by a Counjun-
ction with *Scotland*, being much increased
in Strength, as well as by Manufactures,
and a great Navigation, will in all re-
spects be formidable to all *Europe*, so
soon as an Absolute King shall make use
of that Power against his Neighbours,
without the Check and Controll of a
Parliament.

But on the other side, it is also cer-
tain, that *England* in a time of Peace
has great Advantages by the *Hollanders*,
who in their Passage are necessitated to
frequent their Havens. And there are
now in *Holland* many more *English* Com-
modities, which we could very well
spare, that are transported and used by
us, than *Holland* hath Wares in *England*,
because the *Holland* and other Foreign
Manufactures have for the most part
long since been Prohibited. And since
the Prohibition in *England* of importing
any Goods, save thote of the Growth
and Manufacture of the Country, by
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Foreign Ships into *England*, all our Navigation to that Kingdom is at a stand.

2. It is evident, that the Rivers in *England* are very small, and remote from one another; so that all mutual Traffick, and transporting of Goods there, being necessarily done upon the open Sea, the *English* may suffer great Losses by our private Ships of War.

3. It is certain, that the *English* Traffick by Sea being so great, and remote, may be most Prejudiced in the *Mediterranean* Sea, and the *East-Indies*, by the *Holland* Ships, which during our free Government are much augmented, and must and will be increased more and more.

4. It is clear, that considering our small and dangerous Coast, the *English* by Land can make no Conquest upon *Holland*, unless they can get Footing by means of our intestine Divisions; nor we on them, for another Reason. Besides, Kings will ever be Conquering of Lands; and Prudent Republicks which thrive best by Peace, will never do so, but rather erect Colonies.

5. It is therefore consequently true, That the *English* cannot make War upon us but by Sea. And since those Wars must be carried on purely with
D Money,

Money, because Naval Power cannot subsist by Plundering, and Quartering in an Enemies Country, and that the King of *England* cannot employ his Revenue for that end, having occasion for that and more to maintain his Court; It also follows that he would have need of another standing Revenue or Fund, to be enabled to carry on the said War by Sea.

6. It will be granted. That the said King having a new standing Revenue to maintain those Wars, he would never after call a Parliament to desire Subsidies from them, and consequently the Parliament will never suffer that any perpetual important Tax be established in that Kingdom; because the establishment of such a Tax would utterly devert them of so weighty a Privilege, as is the assembly of Parliaments, in which all Abuses are to be redress'd, and the Extortions, Briberies, and other Oppressions of Ministers and Courtiers prevented or punished, and Right done to the People, before they will engage by an Act of Parliament to pay those heavy Subsidies.

7. It is evident, That so long as we effectually take care of our Naval Power, and increase it as Opportunities

ties offer, a War with us would require so great and chargeable Fleets, that they could not be set to Sea, and maintained by Subsidies or Taxes only, because the Burden would be so great, so unexpected, and so uneasily born by the Inhabitants, that the King would be in continual apprehension and fear of an Insurrection of his Subjects, if he should obstinately persist to make War against us.

8. It is certain, That the Courtiers and Favorits who possess the King's Ear, may make great Profits by this War at Sea by Prizes taken, and Subsidies granted, as long as they continue on shore to manage the same. But if they go to Sea themselves to command in the Fleet, they put themselves in as much Danger of their Lives as the least Person there, by Storms, Shipwracks, Fireships, Bullets; and moreover, run the Hazard of having all their Endeavours during their absence from Court misconstrued, and misrepresented to the King by other Courtiers. In a word, if those Favorites, and Courtiers, remain on shore during the War against *Holland*, they will be necessitated to see the Admiral carry away all the Honour of good Successes, and they the

Blame of the Bad; whilst instead of carefully providing all things necessary, they study to enrich themselves by the Subsidies and Prizes; and the Nation would gain little Honour or Profit by such a chargeable Naval War. And on the other side, if they go to Sea to command the Fleets, they must necessarily part from the Court, and be absent from the King, and consequently run a great Hazard; least in the mean time some malevolent private Enemy, who hath the King's Ear, may so manage the matter, that tho' they went to Sea in the King's Favour, yet they may be called home with Disgrace.

9. It is certain, That *England*, *Scotland* and *Ireland*, having in all Parts a deep and bold Coast, their Cities, Towns, and Villages in the Country being weak, or without Walls and Fortifications, they may in all Places be attacked, and our Men may be Landed under the shelter of our Canon, and so Plunder and Burn those Places. Whereas the *Englisch* cannot do the like in *Holland*, because our small Coast can easily be guarded and secured by our own Forces, and is foul and shallow, that the Enemies Ships of War cannot reach our Strand with their Canon, and in case they

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they should attempt to land with their Boats, they would soon be overfet by the high Surges of the Sea, or at least have their Powder spoil'd. So that what we should fall short of in our Privateering by Sea, we should ballance by our plundering by Land, and burning of Towns, and thereby be richly recompenced. Besides, such plundering and burning will strike a greater Terror and Consternation into the Inhabitants there, than any Losses at Sea would operate amongst us.

10. It cannot be denied, but that in all Monarchical Governments during a War, especially by Sea, vast Sums of Money are ill laid out, and embezel'd by Courtiers, Sea Officers, and Soldiers, and the Stores provided for the Navy frequently misimployed and wasted; so that in a little time the Money raised will fall short; more especially in *England*, where the Subsidies granted by the Parliament, being always limited to a certain Sum, are indeed sufficient but not superfluous; and an *English* Court, above all others, is prodigal and thievish. Whereas on the other side, in a free Commonwealth, and in a time of War by Sea, such exact Accounts are kept, and Regulation used, that neither those
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that are entrusted to provide things necessary, nor those that make use of them, can either mispend or embezel the Publick Money or Provisions; and this may in a particular manner be expected from the *Hollanders*, who have always been famous for Frugality and Parsimony. And it is observable, that this Prodigality of the one Nation, and the Frugality of the other, is not only visible in the publick Treasure, but is also discerned in the private way of living, both of the *English* and *Hollanders*: so that by a War at Sea the Taxes upon the Commonality of both sides increasing, and the Profits decreasing, *Holland*, in proportion to the Country and Purse of the Inhabitants, by well Husbanding the Publick Treasure, would easily hold out longer than *England*, as appeared manifestly in the Year 1667.

All which Particulars being true, it naturally follows, that a War is for both Nations very Mischievous; yet so, that *England* will be able to take many Prizes from us by Sea, and little by Land; We on the other side, few Prizes of the *English* by Sea, but great Booty by Land. But we should be sufficiently prejudiced by them, if we had not a competent Number of Ships
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of War to match their Naval Strength, and by that means should be forced to quit the Sea to the *English*, especially if their Kings and Parliament would not lavish the Strength of that Island on their Luxury and Favourites, but rather in Ships and Mariners.

So that our only Safety is grounded upon the Increase of our Naval Strength to such a Degree, that the *English* Fleets may either be over-ballanced by ours, or not able to hurt us, as likewise upon those Accidents to which a Monarchical Government is always subject, and that a War with us would be extremely pernicious to the Subjects of *England*; and likewise that *London*, by means of greater Traffick and Navigation, would be more formidable to the Kings of *England*, than any of his Foreign Neighbours.

So that in order to avoid a War, we must in all our Differences give them good Words, and gain time, in hopes that in these Monarchical Governments the Kings will either follow their Pleasures, or through Excess of Luxury, and Court-robbery, waste all their Revenues, and run themselves into Debts, or die, or perhaps fall into a Foreign or Intestine War.

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But we are to take care, that we do not suffer our selves, for fear of a War with *England*, to be inveigled into an Alliance, jointly to carry on an Offensive War against any Nation, which may be very formidable to that Country, and not so much to us. For in so doing we should make our selves considerably weaker, and *England* stronger; who having that Thorn pull'd out of their Foot, might afterwards with less fear oppress and trample upon us, while we remain deprived of that Refuge by our own Folly. The Truth is, since *England* is more formidable to us than any Country in the whole Universe, it were an unpardonable Fault in us, to make them yet more formidable to our selves.

And above all, we are to observe, that in order to shun or avoid a War with *England*, we must not suffer our selves to be seduced to alter the Commonwealth for a Monarchical Government; for * *The free Lyon will not be bound again*, was used to be *Holland's* Device and Sense. And if now under a free Government, we should be necessitated to make some steps that way
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* *Leo revinciri liber pernegat.*

to please the King of *England*; I would then ask how we should be able to make the least Resistance against such a Head, as would in a manner become Lord of the Country, through our Weakness and Chains, when he shall by an innate Hatred (which all Monarchs bear to Republicks) attempt to ruin our formidable Naval Strength and Trade, and deprive us of our Navigation, under colour of favouring a Prince related to him, and a Head of his own making, whilst he designs the supreme Power for himself: He would, I say, by this means make us the most miserable Nation that ever was governed by any Monarch; for such a Government would infallibly strip us of all our natural Advantages proceeding from the Seas and Rivers, and not only leave us charged with intolerable Taxes, but oppress us also with an expensive and luxurious way of Living, together with those other infinite Mischiefs which are found ever in those Governments. From whence it evidently follows, that we must defend our free Government, tho' it should be by a War against *England*: For 'tis better and more commendable to fight for our Lives, tho' with the utmost Hazard of Perishing, than to Hang ourselves like *Judas*, for fear of receiving

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some smarting Wounds in the Battle, and to Murder our selves by a double Death of Soul and Body, without hopes of a Resurrection; seeing if the worst befall us, and we be weakened by an *English* War, yet still living under a free Government, we might wait for Accidents and Alterations, and hope to have better Success at another time: Whereas on the contrary, by a Monarchical Government we should for ever be deprived of our Fisheries, Manufactures, and Trade, to the Ruin of our selves and our Posterity, who might justly Curse such base and cowardly Parents.

In all Events it is evident, that *England* fearing no Potentates of *Europe*, except the King of *France*, can make no Alliance with us grounded upon a common Fear; but that only, and consequently all other Alliances with that Kingdom, will be prejudicial to us.

'Tis also as evident, that we are not to make any Alliance with *England*, out of a desire of Conquest; for at the best, when we have employ'd our utmost Strength in pursuit of their Game, we should at last most certainly differ with the *English* Lion about dividing the Prey; who taking the whole to himself, might soon after devour the wretched *Holland* Ass; or at most we should

should only be like Jackals, or Ferrets, to drive the Game into the *English* Net.

It were therefore in truth much better, that *Holland* in her Actions should imitate, not those two silly and unhappy Beasts, but rather the shy and wary Cat, that hunts only for her self.

Since then we can make no advantageous Alliances with *England*, neither for common Conquest, nor common Defence, except against *France* only, we may rati-only conclude, that all Alliances with that Kingdom, unless defensive against *France*, are useless to *Holland*, even those which might proceed from fear of a War with *England*: For it is evident, that whatever advantageous Conditions that King acquires from us, we must immediately make them good; and yet expect that he will nevertheless threaten us with a War, unless we will do many harder things for him.

And indeed he that will not defend his Subjects in their Lives and Liberties, tho' by troublesome and dangerous Wars, is so unworthy of Government, Liberty, and Life, that in all respects he ought to be esteemed the Off-scouring of the World, and his Posterity never to be named in succeeding Generations, without Curses and Detestation.

*Some General and Particular Inferences
drawn from the foregoing Considerations,
touching all our Allies.*

OUT of all which foregoing Particulars, I conceive we may draw the following Corollaries.

First, That all Alliances which *Holland* might make in a time of Peace with any Neighbouring Princes of *Europe*, are wholly unserviceable to us; since in our Necessity we shall never receive Aid from them, but rather be drawn into a War. But in times of War and Trouble we should consider, according to what I formerly mentioned, whether *Holland* were able to defend it self, and continue to do so against its most Potent Neighbours, *France*, *Spain*, and *England*, without any Assistance from abroad. And seeing I suppose we can, it then follows, that if we are attacked by a weaker Power, we must not seek help from those great Potentates mentioned, because they would thereby become Greater and Mightier. And on the contrary, a good Patriot of *Holland* ought to wish, that *France* and *England* may decrease, and that *Spain* may not increase in Strength.

And if it should so fall out, that one of the Three abovementioned Kingdoms should

should make War upon us, it is not at all needful that we therefore should seek Aid from abroad against them by Alliances, unless they of their own accord, and decently offer themselves; for otherwise we shall get nothing but a number of good Words; and if we rely on them, we shall be much hindered, as we lately found in our *English* War, when we were Allied with *France*, and have learned from that Inferior and Ungrateful *Denmark*. But when those Alliances fall into our Laps, then, I say;

2. When *Holland* is fallen into a War with *England*, all Alliances with other Potentates are good, in order to escape, provided our Allies first perform their Engagements.

3. When *Spain* makes War with us, an Offensive Alliance with *France* is good, provided the *French* comply first with their Engagements; and if they will not, it is better to stand upon our own Bottom, and to labour that we run not aground: And seeing we must run the Adventure, it is better to endeavour with full Sail to pass over the Flats, than in expectation of Foreign Pilots, who all may promise to assist us with their Skill, to let our Vessel drive slowly, but certainly on the Sands, and Perish.

It

It is always more decent and honourable for Men to shew that Courage they have, and effectually to exert their utmost Strength against an Enemy, in order to preserve their Rights, than to surrender all through Cowardice and Fear. For tho' they may lose by the War, yet they sell every Advantage so dear to the Enemy, that afterwards neither he nor any other will rashly come on again. But he who for Fear, and want of Courage, gives up any Part of his Estate and Right, invites and pulls down upon his own Head all that a covetous Enemy can desire, and is despised by all Men.

4. All these Disturbances and Wars, whether against *France* (unless that Kingdom were Strengthened by Devouring the *Spanish Netherlands*, and so become our Neighbour) or against any other Potentates, may more easily be overcome without any Alliance; tho' in such a Case the lesser Republicks, and Potentates may, in Favour of *Holland*, be drawn into the War by some preceeding Alliance, because we having gotten what we aimed at, will ever interpret the Alliance made to our best Advantage.

5. It is *ceteris paribus*, more useful either for *Holland*, or other Potentates, to have Alliances with a Republick, than with a Prince

Prince or King, because such Alliances being grounded upon a common Interest, they may assure themselves that they will always be so understood by the Governors of a Commonwealth, who besides are Immortal and Perpetual. Whereas on the other side, single Persons have seldom so much Understanding and Knowledge, as to apprehend their own Interest, much less will they take the Pains to govern by that Rule; and besides, they are very inconstant and mortal, and naturally hate all Republicks.

6. It is, and always will be Dangerous for *Holland*, to make Alliances with *France*, *Spain*, or *England*, because 'tis probable that they who are more esteemed only because they are Kings and possess larger Territories than we, will always oblige us to perform our Engagements first, and expound all ambiguous Points to their own Advantage. But so long as we are in the least fear of *France*, that is, so long as *Spain* can keep the *Netherlands*, we may best enter into Alliance with that Kingdom for common defence against those that might wrong or make War against the one or the other. But when *France* is like to be Master of the *Netherlands*, and become our Neighbour, it is not only necessary for *Holland* to prevent that Potent and, always bold
and

and insolent Neighbour, and to take great care not to make any League, by which *France* may in any measure increase in Power; but all the Potentates and States of *Europe* ought to combine together to hinder the further Growth of that Kingdom, which hath already overgrown all its Neighbours.

Likewise so long as we must dread *England* in the highest degree, it is perfectly useless to make the least Alliance with that Kingdom, save such as is grounded upon a common Fear of a greater Power, as now *France* is; seeing all written Alliances, without common Necessity, are interpreted in favour of the greatest, as happens in all doubtful Cases: Besides that *England* will thus find more cause with appearance of Right to make War against us. For if that be found true, which mean Persons conclude, That all that are in Partnership have a Master; and that all such Partnerships begin *In the Name of God*, but use to end in that of the Devil: 'Tis much more true of Kings and Princes, who have outgrown all Justice; and consequently as true, that so long as *England* intends to have the Quiet or Disquiet of *Holland* at their own disposal, she would be the worst and most Tyrannical Ally for us that were to be found in the whole World, unless the
dread

dread of a more powerful Neighbour should curb that pernicious Inclination.

To sum up all: So long as *Holland* can stand on its own Legs, it is utterly unadvisable to make any Alliance with those who are more Potent; and especially it is not good to perform any thing first, or be before-hand with those unconstant Monarchs and Princes, in hope that they will perform with us afterwards, according to the old saying, They that eat Cherries with great Men, must pay for them themselves; and besides, suffer them to chuse the fairest, and expect at last to be pelted with the Stones, instead of Thanks for the Favour received.

7. And consequently it is certain, That all the Advantage in Articles of an Alliance consists in this, that *Holland* do always covenant that the other Allies shall first perform their Engagements. All other sorts of Alliances are very prejudicial to us: For by the proper Constitution, or ancient Custom of our Government, the Deputies of the Provinces upon all occasion will, where they can expect any private Benefit, suffer themselves to be moved by Foreign Ambassadors to draw in *Holland* to their Party, when they can see no Detriment to accrue thereby to their particular Provinces.

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And

And the following Proverb takes place with those especially (whose Commissioners for the Generality are not concerned for the Publick, so long as their Provinces remain unburdened) *That it is very easy to lie in the Ashes with another Man's Garment, and be warm.* So also 'tis not difficult to take generous Resolutions at the cost of another, to keep Promise, to be liberal and merciful towards our Neighbours, while all other Potentates and States continue to deal openly and fairly with us. But supposing the other Provinces might be somewhat concerned therein, yet is their Interest so inconsiderable, that among their Deputies we ever find that a general Evil is weighed according to the Weigher's particular Interest and no otherwise, how heavily soever another may be oppress'd thereby; especially here, because they are seldom called to account by their Superiors for their Transactions.

And if any one doubts of the Truth of these Inferences, *viz.* That all Superior Powers, especially the Monarchs and Princes of *Europe*, play with their Allies as Children do with Nine-pins, which they set up, and immediately beat down again as they please; and that

that he that first performs is ever the loser, and suffers shame, let him read the Histories of *Francisco Guicciardino*, and *Philip de Commynes*. And if these two famous Politicians, the one an *Italian*, the other a *Netherlander*, writing of Matters in which they had the profoundest Skill, and in which they were very often imploy'd; if they, I say, do not remove these Doubts, much less will it be effected by any reasoning from me.

In the mean time, to conclude, what hath been alledged above (*viz.* seeking our Preservation by Alliances) I shall lay before you that which the Ancients have figured out by the ensuing Fable.

“ A rich but weak Countryman, observing that his poor and strong Neighbour, contrary to preceding Promises made of assisting each other, did notwithstanding steal his Apples, and rob his Orchard; told him of the Injustice and Perfidiousness of the Thing, desiring that he would be satisfied with what he had. To this the strong Boor answered, that this Sermon very well became a rich unarmed Man; but that he being Hungry, could not fill his empty Bel-

ly with such Food. And as to his
former Promises and Engagements for
mutual Defence, such kind of neces-
sity is ever excepted, and that he could
not comply therewith. Upon this the
other weak and old Boor having ga-
thered a Nosegay of sweet Herbs
and beautiful Flowers, threw them
to the Plunderer, saying, I present
you with these Fruits, that you may
not rob my Orchard, which I use to
Sow and Plant for the Use and Re-
freshment of Friends. The Impudent
Young Fellow thinking with himself,
that he must needs be very silly,
who being able to take all, will be
content with so small a matter, rob'd
him more and more of all that came
to hand; insomuch that the Owner
became impatient, and in great haste
gathered up some Stones, and threw
them at the Plunderer; who being
grievously hurt, was necessitated to
to leap down from the Tree and fly.
The old weak Boor finding himself
alone, broke out into these Words:
Formerly we used to say, In Words,
Herbs and Stones, there are great
Vertues: But now I really find the
Weakness of Words and Herbs, *i. e.*
Alliances, and Gifts to Knavish Men.

“ For

“ For all Gifts and Receipts are good
“ for the Physician, and the true Anti-
“ dote in all Politick Distempers, is
“ good Arms and Treasure: So that to
“ make an end, I say, that no Body
“ can defend his Goods against Wicked
“ Men, but by Stones, that is, good
“ Arms, which are the only Things left
“ us, whereby we can bravely defend
“ our Lives and Estates.

F I N I S.

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F I W I S